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Introduction 
C hapter 10 of The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations1 is concerned with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. While the 
extent that the use of these weapons, other than nuclear, will impinge on naval 
warfare (except in connection with naval surface and naval air bombardment of 
land objectives, riverine operations, etc.) is probably fairly limited, the draftsmen 
of the Handbook have deemed it appropriate to include a full chapter on these 
subjects-and rightly so. In addition to discussing the evolution and present 
status of the applicable rules of the international law of war with respect to each 
of those categories of weapons, this commentary will discuss the extent to which 
those rules affect naval warfare qua naval warfare and the extent to which they 
affect the operations of naval units against objectives on land. 
Nuclear Weapons 
When the first atom bomb exploded over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, it 
began a new (and perilous) era for the planet Earth. It also began a controversy 
which has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of a great many people. 
Not unexpectedly, sometime after the facts with respect to the nature of the 
atom bomb and the extent of the casualties and damage inflicted at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki became generally known, an issue was raised as to the legality or 
illegality of the use of the atom bomb-and, subsequently, the same issue was, 
of course, raised as to the use of its far more powerful and devastating successors. 
In the discussion which follows it must be borne in mind that while there are a 
number of conventions placing various types of restrictions on nuclearweapons,2 
there is no convention which specifically outlaws their use.3 In light of the 
complete failure of all of the practically endless efforts undertaken since 1945 to 
accomplish this result, to argue that the use of such weapons is prohibited by 
inference derived from the provisions of international agreements dating from 
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1868, from 1899, or from 1907, appears to be the equivalent of tilting at 
windmills. In view of the foregoing this writer concurs with the statement 
contained in the Handbook to the effect that, "There are no rules of customary 
or conventional intemationallaw prohibiting nations from employing nuclear 
weapons in armed conflict.,,4 Nevertheless, a brief analysis of the arguments pro 
and con appears to be warranted. 
The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, 
of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes WeightS contained a number of 
humanitarian preambular clauses: 
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; 
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of 
men; 
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly 
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; 
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws 
of humanity. 
During the course of the drafting of what became the 1899 Hague Convention 
(II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land6 and its annexed 
Regulations, several provisions were included which have often been cited as 
affecting the subject under discussion. These provisions were: 
Art. 22. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy are not 
unlimited. 
Art. 23. In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is 
especially forbidden: 
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons; ... 
(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury; ... 
The cognate provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annexed Regulations are essentially 
identical with those quoted above? 
Realizing, however, that these and the other provisions that were to be 
included in the Regulations could not possibly cover all of the contingencies that 
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might arise during the course of a war, the Russian representative at the 1899 
Peace Conference, Martens, a noted international lawyer, proposed, and the 
Conference agreed, that a paragraph be included in the preamble which would 
read: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and 
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the 
requirements of the public conscience.8 
Assuming that these preambular provisions are law-making in nature, a 
number of questions arise. Did the use of the atomic bombs in 1945 weaken 
the military forces of the enemy? Did it uselessly aggravate the sufferings of 
disabled men, or render their death inevitable? Did it exceed the limits which 
a belligerent may adopt as a means of injuring the enemy? Did it constitute the 
use of "poison"? Did it represent the employment of a weapon "calculated to 
cause unnecessary suffering"? Did it constitute a failure to give the populations 
and belligerents "the protection and empire of the principles of international 
law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from 
the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience" to which 
they were entided? And, most important, if one or more of these questions is 
answered in the affirmative, does the particular principle apply if the alternative 
would have resulted in a million American military casualties and an even greater 
number of Japanese casualties, military and civilian? In other words, was the 
principle of proportionality applicable?9 While all of those questions have been 
posed here with respect to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they will likewise have to 
be asked-and answered-before any future use of nuclear weapons. 
Literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on both sides of 
the questions posed and it is doubtful that any proponent of either side of the 
argument has been successful in convincing anyone who disagrees with his 
position that it is correct and that the other person's position is incorrect. The 
present writer does not propose to draw himself into that quagmire. Suffice it 
to say that nuclear weapons are with us and at the present time there does not 
appear to be any possibility that they will disappear, at least in the foreseeable 
future. Under those circumstances we can only hope that neither side will make 
the mistake of using them and thus bring an end to civilization, and to life itself, 
on this planet. 
There is, of course, an area of nuclear warfare in which navies would play an 
important role. A preemptive first strike by one side might possibly eliminate 
much of the other side's land-based nuclear deterrent force--but it could not 
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reach the deployed naval-based force, the submarines of which are the 
ever-mobile carriers of nuclear ballistic missiles. Thus, this potential naval 
retaliatory force, maintained by both parties involved in the eyeball-to-eyeball 
confrontation which has more or less existed since shortly after the end ofW orId 
War II, is a major factor in the policy of deterrence. Moreover, the strength and 
speed of these nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines are reputedly 
such that there are experts who believe that they can only be destroyed by nuclear 
weapons, such as nuclear-armed depth charges or nuclear-armed torpedoes. If 
such is the case, the use of these latter nuclear weapons becomes almost inevitable 
as during a period of active hostilities, whether we call it war or armed conflict, 
no nation and no navy is going to permit enemy nuclear-powered submarines 
armed with nuclear ballistic missiles to roam the seas unchallenged. 
One problem which arises is whether successful conventional-weapons 
attacks on nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines (and surface vessels) 
would adversely affect the waters of the oceans and the air of the atmosphere. 
While the United States has lost two nuclear submarines with no such adverse 
effects, this is far from conclusive as the two crews would probably have shut 
down the nuclear reactors and any nuclear weapons aboard the submarines 
would not have been armed; accordingly, the amount of radioactivity released 
by each of those vessels would have been minimal. How much environmental 
damage would be caused by the sinking of a nuclear armed and nuclear-powered 
submarine with its reactor in operation appears to be a relative unknown. 
Moreover, should a war reach the nuclear stage, it is a virtual certainty that any 
naval engagement would include the use of nuclear weapons against the 
opposing enemy fleets. When this occurs the extent of the contamination of the 
oceans and of the atmosphere is incalculable as nuclear explosions would be 
taking place both in the atmosphere and in the water and nuclear-powered ships 
would be sunk with their reactors in operation.10 Of course, should a war reach 
the nuclear stage, such matters would be a small, and comparatively unimportant, 
part of the overall picture. 
The ballistic missiles carried by nuclear-powered submarines, referred to 
above, would, of course, if used, be directed against objectives on land. It is 
doubtful, but not inconceivable, that in a nuclear war a naval bombardment of 
objectives on land might include nuclear-armed shells and missiles. However, 
should a war reach that stage, the results of any such bombardment would be 
miniscule compared to the results that could be expected from landbased nuclear 
ballistic missiles, from the nuclear ballistic missiles released from below the 
surface of the seas, and from the nuclear weapons dropped from the air. 
It is probably necessary to conclude that if and when an armed conflict 
approaches the nuclear stage, law will playa very small role in determining the 
actions of the belligerents. 
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Chemical Weapons 
Chemical warfare agents have been defined as "chemical substances, whether 
gaseous, liquid, or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic 
effects on man, animals and plants."l1 
The earliest formal international attempt to prohibit the use of chemicals in 
warfare occurred at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference which drafted and 
adopted a Declaration stating, "The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from 
the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or 
deleterious gases. ,,12 This Declaration was of unlimited duration. All of the major 
European Powers, including France, Germany, Russia, and the United 
Kingdom, signed and ratified it. The United States neither signed nor ratified 
it. 
The 1899 Declaration was in force during World War I. Despite this, 
Germany used gas against the Russians in Poland in January 1915. The gas was 
delivered by artillery shells but, because of the sub-zero weather, had little effect 
and the incident passed almost unnoticed.13 The first major, and 
well-documented, use of gas occurred in France, on April 22, 1915, when the 
Germans opened containers of compressed chlorine, permitting a favoring wind 
to blow the gas towards the Allied Ypres salient.14 The success of the operation 
far exceeded expectations15 and before the war was brought to an end more 
than three years later many other chemical weapons were being used by both 
sides and were being delivered by artillery, mortars, projectors, etc.16 The Treaty 
of Versailles, which legally terminated World War I as between Germany and 
the Allies, contained the following provision: 
Art. 171. The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation 
are stricdy forbidden in Gemlany. 
The same applies to materials speciall! intended for the manufacture, storage 
and use of the said products or devices.1 
The 1922 Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, 
consisting of representatives of France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, drafted a treaty which was primarily concerned with 
submarine warfare but which included the following provisions: 
Art. 5. The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been jusdy condemned by the 
general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been 
declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties, 
252 Levie on the Law of War 
The signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally 
accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice 
of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as 
between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.IS 
To become effective this treaty required the ratification of all of the participants 
in the Conference. France refused to ratifY it because of objections to some of 
the provisions with respect to submarine warfare. Accordingly, the treaty never 
entered into force. However, three years later another conference, this one 
concerned with international trade in weapons and ammunition, drafted the 
1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asph~ating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. 9 While 
much of its wording was taken almost verbatim from the prior draftings, its 
importance warrants the setting forth of its operative provisions in their entirety: 
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general 
opinion of the civilized world; and 
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which 
the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and 
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of 
International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; 
Declare: 
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to 
Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this 
prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound 
as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration. 
Strange to relate, while the United States had ratified the Washington Treaty, 
with its provision prohibiting the use of poisonous gases, just two years earlier, 
and was the chief proponent of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it did not ratifY the 
latter until 50 years later, in 1975! 
Many of the states which have ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol have done 
so with a so-called "first use" reservation. Typical of those reservations is that 
of the United Kingdom: "The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on His 
Britannic Majesty toward any Power at enmity with him whose armed forces, 
or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in 
the Protocol. ,,20 It does not appear that this "first use" reservation has ever been 
invoked despite the not-infrequent use of the prohibited gases. For example, 
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Italy, a party to the Protocol (as was Ethiopia), admittedly used poison gas in its 
1935-1936 war with Ethiopia. Japan, although a party to the 1899 Declaration, 
did not ratify the Protocol until after World War II. OnJune 5, 1942, President 
Roosevelt warned the Japanese against the use of poisonous gas.21 While at that 
time Japan denied using such gas in China,22 it has never officially denied such 
use since the end of the war. Egypt, a Party to the 1925 Protocol (as was the 
Yemen Arab Republic), is alleged to have used gas in the civil war in Yemen. 
Iraq, also a party to the Protocol (as is Iran), has been accused of using gas in its 
recent war with Iran.23 In none of these cases is there evidence of retaliation in 
kind, probably because the victim of the gas attack was not in possession of a 
stock of chemical weapons. 
During World War II Hitler on occasion considered the use of chemical 
weapons against England. However, he apparently realized, or his military 
advisers were able to convince him, that Germany's opponents were well able 
to reply in kind and that, in the long run, the use of such weapons would be 
self-defeating to Germany?4 On June 5, 1943, President Roosevelt warned 
Germany that the use of chemical weapons by any Axis country against anyone 
of the United Nations would result in "swift retaliation in kind," specifying that 
the targets would be "munition centers, seaports, and other milita~ objectives 
throughout the whole extent of the territory of such Axis country." 5 With the 
possible exception of Japanese use in China, chemical weapons were not used 
by any belligerent during World War 11.26 
The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted a number of 
resolutions on the subject of chemical warfare.27 A resolution adopted in 1968, 
among other things, requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the 
assistance of experts, a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) 
weapons.28 This report, which was submitted to the General Assembly in 1969, 
found that "because of the scale and intensity of the potential effects of their use, 
they are considered as weapons of mass destruction.,,29 The report contained 
the follo\ving statement: 
The general conclusion of the report can thus be summed up in a few lines. 
Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict 
how enduring the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of 
. d th· . hi h li 30 SOCIety an e enVIronment In w c we ve. 
Upon the receipt of that report the General Assembly adopted a resolution to 
the effect that the 1925 Geneva Protocol "embodies the generally recognized 
rules of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflict of 
all biological and chemical methods of warfare.,,31 Of course, this merely 
represented the political judgment of those nations which voted in favor of the 
resolution. 
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The need to maintain a supply of chemical weapons for use in retaliation 
against a violator of the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, or any other 
"first user," has created the longtime problem of finding a safe method for the 
disposition of overage gas, with leaky containers adding to the difficulties of the 
possessor. One technical advance in this field, the so-called "binary" gases, will 
considerably alleviate this problem. These gases consist of two non-toxic 
chemicals which only become toxic when mixed, an action which is 
accomplished while, for example, an artillery shell is in flight. A representative 
of the Chemical Corps of the United States Army listed the advantages of binary 
weapons as including "improved safety during production, transportation and 
storage; no requirement for high-cost toxic production facilities; and simplified 
I d ':::""!1! •• d ,,32 ow-cost eUlllltanzatlon proce ures. 
A number of problems have arisen with respect to the interpretation of the 
1925 Geneva Protocol. One such problem is whether it includes within its 
prohibitions the use of smoke, sometimes a major weapon in naval warfare, and 
the use of riot control agents, such as lachrymatories, or tear gas. The argument 
against the use of smoke, that it at least temporarily incapacitates due to a type 
of asphyxia, is weak and is not very frequendy advanced. Originally the British 
interpreted the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol as covering 
lachrymatories.33 However, deeming it an essential weapon for use in Northern 
Ireland, in 1970 the British Government took the position that "CS and other 
such gases" were not prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.34 Practically all 
governments use lachrymatories domestically for the suppression of such events 
as riots and other civil disturbances. Nevertheless, the propriety of their use in 
armed conflict remains a matter of dispute. 
A further problem of interpretation is whether the Protocol includes within 
its prohibitions the use of herbicides. This problem arose during World War II 
when the question was raised as to whether it would be in accordance with 
international law to use "crop-destroying chemicals" on the gardens being 
grown by Japanese units located on by-passed islands of the Pacific. Although 
the JUdge Advocate General of the Army found no legal impediment to such 
action,3 no action was taken, probably because it would have been a waste of 
resources. During the hostilities in Vietnam herbicides were used extensively, 
both for crop destruction and as a defoliant?6 When the issue was raised in the 
Senate during the consideration by that body of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 
General Counsel of the Department of Defense arrived at the same conclusion 
the Army had reached in 1945?7 Nevertheless, as will be noted below, the 
United States has renounced the first use of herbicides except for certain 
1 limi· d 38 extreme y te purposes. 
Another such problem of interpretation is whether incendiary weapons are 
within the prohibitions of the Protocol. The United States has long taken the 
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position that there is no rule ofinternationallaw prohibiting the use of incendiary 
weapons?9 At a conference of experts convened in 1969 by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, some of the experts were of the opinion that the 
use ofincendiary weapons, and particularly napalm, was prohibited by the 1925 
Geneva Protocol because, by burning the oxygen, it "causes a sort of asphyxia." 
Others took the position that incendiary weapons were not prohibited but were 
subject to "discriminating" use. The ICRC concluded that "more extensive 
studies should be made of the consequences of incendiary weapons in order to 
reach a clear legal solution as to their employment.,,40 The U.N. Report with 
respect to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, published that same 
year, contains the following relevant statement: 
We also recognize that there is a dividing line between chemical agents of 
warfare, in the sense in which we use the tenns, and incendiary substances, such 
as napalm and smoke, which exercise their effects through fire, temporary 
deprivation of air or reduced visibility. We regard the latter as weapons which are 
better classified with high explosives than with the substances with which we are 
concerned. They are therefore not dealt with further in this report.41 
Studies were subsequently made by a group of experts appointed by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, by the Stockholm Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), and by the ICRC itselfin 1973, in 1974, and in 1976; and 
probably by other organizations and institutions. The U.N. experts found it 
appropriate "to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the necessity of 
working out measures for the prohibition of the use, production, development 
and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons,,42- a clear indication 
of their understanding that there was no such prohibition then extant. The 
author of the SIPRI report stated that "there was never any positive indication 
that the intention of the [1925] Geneva Protocol was to prohibit incendiaries. ,,43 
The ICRC studies were inconclusive.44 Finally, the subject was discussed by 
the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons of the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 45 and the Diplomatic 
Conference adopted a resolution in which it recommended the convening of a 
conference to draft agreements on certain conventional weapons.46 Such a 
conference was held in 1980 and resulted in, among others, a Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofIncendiary Weapons. 47 This Protocol 
does not prohibit the use of incendiaries; it merely places certain restrictions on 
the manner in which they may be used. The sum total to be derived from the 
foregoing survey is, of course, that incendiary weapons do not come within the 
purview of the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or, for that matter, of 
any other international agreement on the law of war. 
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The 1980 Protocol provides that it is prohibited "to make the civilian 
population, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by 
incendiary weapons." (Of course, the law of war generally prohibits such attacks 
by any weapon!) Such a prohibition, and the accompanying restrictions on the 
use of air-delivered and other types of incendiary weapons intended to 
implement that prohibition, would obviously have no effect on naval 
engagements at sea. However, they would be applicable with respect to naval 
bombardments ofland targets, either by warships or by aircraft, and with respect 
to the use of incendiaries by marines ashore. 
Now let us see where the United States stands generally on the question of 
chemical warfare. It has already been mentioned that the United States did not 
ratify the 1899 Declaration and that the 1925 Geneva Protocol was not ratified 
by it until 1975. During that 50-year interim period the position of the United 
States with respect to chemical warfare was well summed up in the predecessor 
to the Handbook, which contained the following statement: 
The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or 
restricts the use in warfare of poisonous or asphyxiating gases or of bacteriological 
weapons. Although the use of such weapons frequendy has been condemned by 
states, including the United States, it remains doubiful that, in the absence oj a spedfic 
restriction established by treaty a state legally is prohibited at present from resorting to their 
use. However, it is clear that the use of poisonous gas or bacteriological weapons 
may be considered justified against an enemy who first resorts to the use of these 
weapons. [Footnotes omitted]48 
The United States has almost uniformly taken the ~osition that there is no 
customary law prohibiting the use of these weapons.4 During the hostilities in 
Vietnam the United States used two controversial types of chemical weapons -
tear gas and herbicides.so Tear gas was originally used for humanitarian 
purposesS1 but its utility as a non-lethal ~ quickly became apparent and it was 
widely used for a number of purposes. 2 This created considerable discussion 
both in the United States and elsewhere in the world with the result that on 
November 25,1969, President Nixon issued a statement in which he said that 
he was resubmitting the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for its advice and 
consent to ratification and that the United States "Reaffirms its oft-repeated 
renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons" and "Extends this 
renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals."S3 
Mter extensive hearings and further commitments by the Executive Branch, 
the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the 1925 Geneva 
ProtocolS4 and President Ford ratified it on January 22, 1975. The ratification 
was deposited, and the Protocol became binding .on the United States, on April 
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10, 1975. On April 8, 1975, President Ford signed Executive Order 11,850 
which provides: 
The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of 
herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, 
for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their 
immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except 
in defensive military modes to save lives such as: 
(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and 
distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war. 
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask 
or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided. 
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of 
downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners. 
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of 
immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and 
ramili· .. 55 pa tary orgaruzatlons. 
Fortunately, since the issuance of that Executive Order, the United States has 
not been involved in any armed conflict which would make its application 
appropriate. However, the Handbook, issued in 1987, further illuminates the 
United States position with respect to the use of chemical weapons. It will be 
recalled that its predecessor, The LAw oj Naval Warfare, stated that it would be 
difficult to hold that use of such weapons was prohibited by customary 
internationallaw.56 In a complete turnabout, the Handbook says: 
The United States considers the prohibition against first use of lethal and 
incapacitating chemical weapons to be part of customary international law and, 
therefore, binding on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas 
Protoco1.57 
It will be interesting to record the reactions to this position of states which are 
still not parties to the 1925 Protocol and which have not committed themselves 
in the General Assembly of the United Nations.58 
As we shall see, there is in existence a Convention which supplements the 
1925 Geneva Protocol by prohibiting the development, production, and 
stockpiling of biological agents and their delivery weapons. 59 Although separate 
proposals made in 1962 by both the Soviet Union and the United States included 
similar provisions with respect to chemical weapons,60 both the United 
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Kingdom and the United States later insisted on separating chemical weapons 
from the others. As a result, despite fairly continuous efforts, the only restriction 
on chemical weapons at the present time is the 1925 Geneva Protocol which 
prohibits use only. 
In 1984 then Vice President Bush went to Geneva to attend a meeting of the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) and to table a United States proposal which 
sought to accomplish for chemical weapons what had already been accomplished 
for biological weapons. 61 It has since been under consideration in the CD, which 
subsequently drafted and studied a 1987 revision.62 In January 1989 a conference 
hosted by the French Government in Paris adopted a resolution calling for 
reaffirmation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and stressed "the necessity of 
concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the 
development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on 
their destruction. ,,63 In July 1989 the United States and the Soviet Union 
reached agreement on the key remaining issues64 and currently (December 
1989) the CD is working on a May 1989 version 65 with changes made up to 
15 October 1989.66 In view of the insistence of the United States on 
"anywhere-anytime" inspections, it is of interest to know that the Soviet Union 
has agreed to permit "surprise inspections" and that it is now the United States 
which has a problem in this respect in view of the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution, prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures. ,,67 
The wheels of diplomacy grind slowly (witness the years of discussion of the 
1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and of the 1977 Protocols68), so there 
is still the possibility that in the not-too-distant future there will be agreement 
on a Convention which will prohibit the development, production and 
stockpiling of chemical agents and their delivery systems, as well as providing 
for the destruction of all such chemical agents now in the arsenals of parties to 
h C . 69 suc a onventJ.on. 
Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons 
Bacteriological (biological) 70 weapons have been defined as "living 
organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, which 
are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which 
depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant 
attacked.,,71 International restrictions on the use of biological weapons present 
far fewer legal problems than do those on the use of chemical weapons. In fact, 
the legal situation is so clear that the major problem is, once again, that of 
ensuring compliance. 
It will be recalled that by the declaration contained in the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol the Parties agreed "to extend the prohibition [against the use of 
poisonous gas] to the use of bacteriological methods ofwarfare.,,72 The League 
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of Nations Disarmament Conference discussed the matter and attempted, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to draft a treaty which would have prohibited the production 
and stockpiling of both chemical and biological weapons. During World War 
II considerable scientific research was done on biological weapons. However, 
no such weapons were used by either side, with one possible exception. The 
Soviet Union has long contended that during World War II the Japanese had a 
unit called "Bacteriological Detachment 731" located at Harbin in China and 
that this unit had conducted bacteriological experiments on several thousand 
Chinese, Koreans, Russians, and, perhaps, Americans. When the war ended, 
many of the senior officers of this unit were taken into Soviet custody and in 
December 1949 twelve of them were tried by a Soviet court at Khabarovsk, 
were found guilty of engaging in bacteriological warfare, and received sentences 
of confinement in a labor correction camp for terms varying from two to 
twenty-five years.73 In 1982 the ~:;ranese Government acknowledged that such 
a unit had existed during the war. Assuming that the Soviet charges are correct, 
it would appear that the activities of the Japanese unit never passed the 
experimental stage, that it never reached the stage of actual use of biologicals 
against enemy military forces as a weapon of war. 
In 1962 the Soviet Union tabled at the meeting of the Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) a proposal for general and complete 
disarmament which included the following provision: "The prohibition, and 
destruction of all stockpiles, and the cessation of the production of all kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological 
and radiological weapons.,,75 
A few weeks later the United States submitted its counterproposal with a 
provision which called for "Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, 
bacteriological, and other weaEons of mass destruction and cessation of the 
production of such weapons.,,7 
In view of the close similarity of the two proposals, it would seem that 
agreement with respect at least to chemical and biological weapons could have 
been quickly attained.77 However, such was not the case. There were those 
who took the position that chemical and biological weapons should not be joined 
in the same treaty as there was experience with chemical weapons, but none 
with biologicals. While the relevance of this argument is far from clear, it was 
sufficient to delay the affirmative action which might otherwise have been taken. 
Finally, in 1969 the United Kingdom submitted a proposal which called for a 
complete ban on "microbial or other biological agents," but made no mention 
of chemical weapons?8 When, in 1971, the United States and the Soviet Union 
tabled identical drafts79 relating to biologicals only, the result was a foregone 
conclusion. Using that draft as a working document the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament (CCD, which had replaced ENDC) produced a 
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Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
D . 8° 1 . .. estructlon. ts most Important provlSlon states: 
Art. 1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any 
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain: 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
It also contains provisions requiring each State Party to destroy all of the items 
specified in Article 1 within nine months of the Convention coming into force 
(presumably, for the State concerned); and an undertaking not to transfer to any 
recipient, or to encourage the manufacture of, any of the prohibited items. 
It is thus evident that States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to the 
1972 Bacteriological Convention are prohibited from developing, manufacturing, 
stockpiling, acquiring, retaining, or using biological weapons In view of the coverage 
of the Convention, nations have not made "first use" reservations. The two 
international agreements were intended to, and should eliminate biologicals 
from the arsenals of all such Parties and should mean that in any future war, large 
or small, limited or unlimited, conventional or unconventional, biologicals 
would not be a factor. Unfortunately, events have already demonstrated that 
these expectations will not be met. 
A catastrophe occurred in Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union in 1980 in which 
more than 1,000 people died as a result of what appears to have been anthrax 
poisoning, although Soviet officials claimed that the deaths had been caused by 
meat contaminated by hoof-and-mouth disease.81 In addition, the United States 
has contended that the Soviet Union, either direcdy or through surrogates, has 
used biolog!cal (as well as chemical) weapons in Southeast Asia and in 
Afghanistan.82 If, as is generally believed, the Sverdlovsk incident involved 
anthrax, and if, as the United States contends, biologicals have been used by the 
Vietnamese in Kampuchea and Laos and by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, 
then the Soviet Union is manufacturing and using biologicals contrary to the 
provisions of the two agreements to which it is a party. Unfortunately, the 1925 
Geneva Protocol contains no provision for verification and the only provision 
for verification contained in the 1972 Convention is a meaningless one providing 
for resort to the Security Council. 
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The predecessor to the Handbook, published at a time when the United States 
was not a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and when the 1972 Bacteriological 
Convention had not yet been drafted, stated: 
The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or 
restricts the use in warfare ... of bacteriological weapons. Although the use of 
such weapons frequendy has been condemned by states, including the United 
States, it remains doubtful that, in the absence of a specific restriction established 
by treaty, a state le~y is prohibited at present from resorting to their use. 
[Footnotes omitted.] 3 
This was probably a fair statement of the United States position until November 
25, 1969, when President Nixon, on behalf of the United States, renounced the 
use of biological weapons b~ this country.84 Three months later he included 
toxins in this renunciation.8 Then this country became a party to the 1972 
Bacteriological Convention and in 1975 it finally ratified the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol with its ban on the use of biologicals. Once again, however, it appears 
that the Handbook may be going too far when it asserts: 
The United States considers the prohibition against the use of biological 
weapons during armed conflict to be part of customary intemational law and 
thereby binding on all nations whether or not they are farties to the 1925 Gas 
Protocol or the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.8 
Can it be that while at a particular point in time a principle may not necessarily 
be a binding rule of customary international law, it becomes such as soon as the 
United States ratifies a treaty containing that principle? Certainly, the United 
States did not consider itself bound by any rule of customary international law 
prohibiting the use of biologicals when it issued its military manuals in 1955 and 
1956; nor did it consider itself so bound at any time thereafter, even when (and 
until) President Nixon made his 1969 and 1970 statements unilaterally 
renouncing the use of biologicals and toxins. Would the 50 or more nations 
which are not parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 50 or more nations 
which are not parties to the 1972 Bacteriological Convention agree with the 
quoted statement? Or is this statement, and the similar one with respect to 
chemical weapons quoted above, inserted in order to convince non-parties that 
they might just as well ratify the agreements as they are bound by them in any 
event? 
In view of the mobility of naval forces, it has always been considered unlikely, 
but not impossible, that naval vessels at sea will have to meet the problem of 
defending themselves against an attack using biological (or chemical) weapons. 
Should such an attack occur, for example by guided missiles which succeed in 
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penetrating the vessel's defenses and dispense the lethal item, the attack would 
have a devastating effect because air-intake systems would quickly disseminate 
it throughout the interior of the vessel, or because concurrent high-explosive 
ordnance would have pierced the shell of the ship. Items such as masks, special 
clothing, etc., available for the protection of the individual members of the crew, 
would gready impede the functioning of the crew, even if there was time to 
don them. In addition, naval vessels, naval guns and naval aircraft might well be 
among the weapons systems used for the delivery of biologicals against land 
targets, should biologicals ever be used in wartime. Thus, in a field trial, a ship 
sailing 16 kilometers offihore travelled a distance of 260 kilometers parallel to 
the coastline discharging a harmless powder. The resulting aerosol covered an 
area of over 75,000 square kilometers. Had the material disseminated been a 
biological "depending on the organism and its degree of hardiness, areas from 
5,000 to 20,000 square kilometers could have been effectively attacked, infecting 
a high proportion of unprotected people in the area. ,,87 
Conclusions 
There is no law in force, conventional or customary, which prohibits the use 
of nuclear weapons. However, there can be no winners, but only losers, no 
victors, but only vanquished, in the event of a nuclear war. Whether or not a 
war in which nuclear powers are involved becomes a nuclear war will depend 
upon the wisdom and leadership of the political leaders of those powers and 
upon the extent to which the desire to win the war outweighs a reluctance to 
bring disaster not only upon the enemy, but also upon their own people and 
upon the peoples of neutral nations. 
Chemical and biological weapons, like nuclear weapons, are weapons of mass 
destruction. Once released they are beyond the control of the user and, like 
nuclear weapons, their effects can come back to haunt the user. The use of 
certain chemicals can have widespread, long-lasting, and severe consequences 
for the environment and for the populations. This is even more true with respect 
to the use of many biologicals. The use of either of these types of weapons is 
prohibited by an international agreement to which more than two-thirds of the 
nations of the world community are parties. The very existence of biological 
weapons is prohibited by an international agreement with a similar amount of 
participation. Hopefully, there will, in due course, be an identical prohibition 
with respect to chemical weapons. 
In view of the tremendous lethal and destructive capabilities of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons one might almost regret our inability to 
tum the clock back to the nineteenth century, when nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons, as we now know them, were not even a gleam in a 
scientist's eyes. 
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Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons 
Addendum 
In 1971 there was drafted a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear 
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor 
and the Subsoil ThereoJ. The United States is a Party to this Treaty. 
In 1972 the United Nations Committee on Disannament drafted a Convention 
on tIle Prohibition of tIle Development, Production and Stockpiling of Baderiological 
(BiologicaQ and Toxin Weapons and on their Destrudion which was approved by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. The United States has ratified this 
Convention, as have the great majority of other States. All types of 
bacteriological and biological weapons are now completely banned and each 
State is given nine months from the date of the entry into force of the 
Convention within which to destroy all such weapons in its stockpile. 
(presumably this means nine months after the Convention enters into force for 
a particular country.) The Convention itself entered into force on 26 March 
1975. As is not unusual, Iraq is believed to continue to possess such weapons 
268 Levie on the Law of War 
and has placed constant difficulties in the way of the United Nations inspectors 
who have attempted to ascertain whether it is complying with the terms of the 
1991 Security Council Resolution (S.C. Res. 687) requiring their destruction, 
as well as that of chemical weapons. 
In 1993 the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a Convention 
on the Prohibition !if the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use !if Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction. This Convention supplements the 1925 Geneva 
Gas Protocol which merely prohibited "use." Once again, Iraq is believed to 
continue to possess such weapons and has placed constant difficulties in the way 
of the United Nations inspectors who have attempted to ascertain whether it is 
complying with the terms of Security Council Resolution 687. (The United 
States Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty on 24 
April 1997, despite the vehement opposition of Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and President Clinton ratified it 
on 25 April 1997. Unfortunately, the ratification includes a number of 
"understandings," many of which will not coincide with the interpretations of 
other Parties to the Convention.) 
On 15 December 1994 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted 
a resolution in which it requested the International Court of Justice to provide 
an advisory opinion on the question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
in any circumstances permitted under international law?" The Court decided 
unanimously that "There is in neither customary nor conventional international 
law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and by 
a vote of eleven to three that "There is in neither customary nor conventional 
international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons as such." However, a further holding of the Court, on 
which the vote was seven to seven, decided by the President's casting vote, 
states: 
It follows from the above mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable 
in anned conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. 
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements 
of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance 
of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake. 
